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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs-
R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, and WILLIAM 
6. DYER, individually and as General 
Partners for REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
CONSULTANTS 
Defendants/Respondents 
Appeal No. 20960 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. While the plaintiff/appellant has sought relief in the lower 
court from torts arising out of business relations between himself and 
defendants/respondents (and their attorney acting in their behalf), he has 
at the same time asked for a quieting of title to the real property owned 
by Real Estate Development Consultants, (REDC), a Utah partnership in which 
the respective parties each claim a controlling interest. Since Section 
78-13-1 of the Utah Judicial Code requires that such action "must be tried 
in the county in which the subject (property) is situated...", then this 
aspect of the case becomes controlling and dictates the proper venue. 
2. Defendants claim that the plaintiff provided "none" of the 
elements of a quiet title action in the original complaint. While these 
elements might have been laid out more explicitly, yet they are contained 
in the complaint. Only two elements are absolutely essential: 
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a. That the plaintiff alleges title to the property: In Para-
graph 4 of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges to being the "legitimate 
General Partner of said partnership" (R. 1), a partnership previously 
referred to as REDC, the owner of property described in Exhibit "A" of the 
Complaint. (R. 4) 
b. That the interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to 
the alleged claims of title or interest held by the plaintiff: In Para-
graph 3 of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendents "have performed 
certain illegal acts on behalf of the Limited Partnership", namely, 
"contracting to sell (and in fact conveying by warranty deed) property 
belonging to the partnership." (R. 3) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The defendants admit in Paragraph 3 of their Brief, under 
Statement of the Case, that Real Estate Development Counsultants is a 
limited partnership and "is the undisputed owner of the real property in 
question." The quiet title issue stems not from the name in which record 
title resides but who may properly act for the partnership. If the plain-
tiff is the "legitimate General Partner", the person who is named in the 
only Certificate of Limited Partnership on file with the Kane County 
Clerk's office, then only he, and not one of the defendants, may properly 
sign an instrument conveying or encumbering the partnership property. 
2. Plaintiff does not allege "that defendants wrongfully removed 
him as general partner of REDC," as defendant's claim in Paragraph 5 of 
their Brief, rather that he, the plaintiff, is the legitimate General 
Partner. The fact that Mr. Michael Dyer has presumed to act for the 
partnership by executing a warranty deed on behalf of REDC (a copy of which 
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instrument is on record in the Kane County Recorders Office and attached as 
Addendum "A") should make it abundantly clear that the interest in the 
property asserted by the defendants is adverse to the interest claimed by 
the plaintiff. 
3. The defendants have failed completely to support their 
contention that the "same issues were before the 4th Judical District 
Court" in a previously filed action. The only similarity which can be 
shown is that they, the defendants, asked for a "distribution of assets 
according to Utah State Law" (5th Cause of Action, Addendum "B" attached) 
while the plaintiff asked the 6th Judicial District court for an "order 
showing forth the proper priority of distribution of further moneys 
received by the partnership." (R. 3) But that was only in one of the five 
otherwise totally distinct causes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the defendents overlooked to make a statement of the facts 
or to respond to our statements in the initial Brief, we are unable to 
reply to theirs. We would therefore stand on our inital statement and 
simply observe that the defendants have provided very little information or 
facts to support their assertions, perhaps for obvious reasons. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to what defendents claim in the second paragraph of 
their Summary, the plaintiff has not tried to quiet title in his own name 
personally. We both agree that title rests and should rest in the record 
name of REDC. But the official county record also clearly shows that it is 
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the plaintiff who is authorized to sign for the partnership. Neither of 
the defendants nor their attorney is so authorized. And when anyone 
presumes to execute deeds on behalf of the record owner other than the one 
duly authorized, it creates a very serious title question which must be 
settled in a court of law. The form of that action would be a quiet title 
action. 
And while the defendants' attorney continues to assert that the 
issues are "identical" in the two cases, he offers absolutely nno inform-
ation in support of this bald-faced assertion. The most precursory exam-
ination made of the two complaints discloses the fact that on only one 
point is there even any similarity (please compare defendants' Complaint 
filed in the 4th Judicial District attached as Addendum "B" and plaintiff's 
Complaint found in the record, R. 1 through R. 4.) 
The action brought by the plaintiff can hardly be called 
frivolous when the defendants' attorney is deeding off property belonging 
to the limited partnership and refusing to account for funds thus obtained. 
As to his proposed alternative, i.e., refiling the case in the 4th 
District, this would hardly speed things along if that were the wrong 
jurisdiction. The plaintiff has no desire to delay the matter. He obtains 
nothing by delay since it is he who has advanced substantial sums of money 
to the partnership and is now being deprived of any immediate opportunity 
of having that money returned. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
PLAINTIFF'S TORT CLAIMS STEM FROM A QUIET TITLE ISSUE 
WHICH IS CONTROLLING AS TO VENUE. 
All of the causes of action brought by the plaintiff stem from the 
presumption of the defendants to act for the general partner. If these 
actions by the defendants, Davis and Dyer, are without the foundation of 
due process, as the plaintiff alleges, then the plaintiff does indeed have 
a case for damages against the defendants. But since these "illegal acts" 
grew out of or led up to the deeding of real property, adverse to the 
interests of the plaintiff who claims to be the true general partner, it 
has as its basis a quiet title action. 
The state statute authorizing a quiet title action is set forth 
as follows: 
78-40-1. An action may be brought by any person against another 
who claims an estate or interest in real property...adverse to him 
for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) 
Since an action to quiet title can only be brought in the county 
where the partnership property lies, then that becomes the controlling 
place of trial or venue. 
78-13-1. Actions for the following causes must be tried in the 
county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, 
is situated... (1) For the recovery of real property, or of an 
estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form 
of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property. 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
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Point II 
THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF ARE IN THE CHARACTER OF THOSE TYPICALLY 
HANDLED IN A QUIET TITLE ACTION. 
According to 74 C.J.S., Section 1 under "Quieting Title", 
The purpose of a suit to quiet title or remove a cloud is to 
determine the existing title to property and the validity of 
adverse claims thereto. 
Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "quieting title" as follows: 
A remedy, originating in equity, enlarged and supplemented in many 
jurisdictions by statute, having for its purpose an adjudication 
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to 
that of the plaintiff, is invalid, so that the plaintiff and those 
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger 
of the hostile claim. 
Even though the instant case differs somewhat from a traditional 
quiet title action, because the litigants are all partners in the same 
partnership, yet the effect sought by the plaintiff is identical with those 
described above and so must qualify in the "quiet title" category. It is 
one thing for partners to dispute amoung themselves about partnership 
business but when limited partners presume to be general partners without 
establishing their legal right to do so by due process, and then issue 
deeds on behalf of the partnership, they have clearly set up a hostile 
claim against the claims of the legitimate general partner who had hereto-
fore executed deeds on behalf of the partnership. 
We would here cite from 65 Am Jur 2d, Section 20, under 'Quieting 
Title" (p.158): 
In some cases, courts have canceled instruments which have been 
executed without authority by executors and administrators, and by 
agents, officers, and other fiduciaries, as constituting a cloud 
on title. 
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To further clarify the issue we would like to quote the 
definition given in Black's Law Dictionary,(4th Edition): 
Quiet, v. To pacify; to render secure or unassailable by the 
removal of disquieting causes or disputes. This is the meaning of 
the word in the phrase "action to quiet title," which is a pro-
ceeding to establish the plaintiff's title to land by bringing 
into court an adverse claimant and there compelling him either to 
establish his claim or be forever after stopped from asserting it. 
This is precisely what we seek to do with the action brought 
against the defendants. 
Point III 
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT WHICH CONSTITUTE A QUIET 
TITLE ACTION. 
In the annotations under "Complaint" in Sec.78-40-1, (Quiet 
Title), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): 
A complaint under this section is sufficient which states the 
ultimate facts that plaintiff is the owner of the lands and that 
defendant claims an interest adverse to him, without setting out 
the facts in detail; Glasmann v. O'Donnell, 6 U. 446, 24 P0 537, 
applying to C. L. 1888, Section"T468 and following Mining Co. v. 
Kerr, 130 U.S. 256,9 S. Ct. 511. 
In action to quiet title, plaintiff may allege his title, owner-
ship, and possession in general terms and thereunder may prove 
whatever title he has. State v. Rolio, 71 U. 91, 262 P. 987. 
Good pleading requires that plaintiff allege, in action to 
quiet title, that he was the owner or entitled to possession of 
real estate at time of commencement of the action, and that the 
estate or interest claimed by defendant is adverse or hostile to 
plaintiff's alleged claim of title or interest. Express averments 
are not required; it is sufficient if that may be inferred from 
the allegations made. Worley v. Peterson, 80 U. 27, 12 P. 2d 579, 
applying C.L. 1917, Section IWl and following Tate v. Rose, 35 U. 
229, 99 P. 1003. 
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Some references say possession must also be claimed but others 
make it clear this is not an essential: 
Contrary to the rule originally administered by the courts of 
equity, our statutory action to quiet title does not require that 
a plaintiff allege and prove his possession of the disputed 
property. U.C.A. 1953, Section 78-40-1; State v. Santiago, Utah, 
590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (1979); Gibson v. McSurrTn, 37 Utah 158, 165-
66, 106 P. 669, 671 (1910). (Quoted~Trom Wood v. Myrup, Utah 
1984, 681 P. 2nd 1255, at p. 1257) 
We must reassert what we have said in the Statement of the 
Issues: the Complaint as filed in the 6th Judicial District Court did in 
fact contain the necessary elements to sustain a quiet title action. As 
our citation from the Utah Code Annotated makes clear, "Express averments 
are not required; it is sufficient if that may be inferred from the 
allegations made." (Emphasis added) (quoted from Worley v. Peterson, 80 U. 
27, 12 P 2d 579.) 
The complaint states as follows: 
1. The real property subject of the action is located in Kane 
County (Para. 2, R. 1) 
2. The defendants are accused of performing "certain illegal 
acts on behalf of the limited partnership" (Para. 3, R. 1) 
3. That partnership is identified as Real Estate Development 
Consultants (REDC) in Paragraph 3, (R. 1), a full legal discription being 
attached to the complaint as Addendum "A". (R. 4) 
4. Those "certain illegal" acts are identifed in Paragraph 3 as 
"contracting with third parties for the sale of partnership property." 
5. That in so doing, they were "claiming an interest adverse" to 
those of the plaintiff, i.e. presuming to own or control the property for 
the partnership. (Para. 5 and 6, R. 2) 
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6. And which was "jeopardizing the financial interests of the 
plaintiff," by challenging his property rights as the "legitimate General 
Partner for said partnership." (Par. 4, R. 1) 
The plaintiff's assertion that he, and only he, was the legit-
imate general partner is his claim to being the "owner" of the subject real 
property. Not that he claimed personal ownership as the defendants would 
construe it, but simply that he as the General Partner was solely empowered 
to control partnership business, and specifically to "sell or exchange" 
partnership property. (See p. 3 of Partnership Agreement attached as 
Addendum "C") 
CONCLUSION 
Since the action filed in the 6th Judicial District Court had as 
its basis a dispute over the control of title to real property, it needed 
to be filed in the county where the real property was located. A court in 
any other county lacked appropriate jurisdiction. The statute says that 
"actions...for the the recovery of real property or of an estate or 
interest therein, or for the determination Jj^ amy form of such right or 
interest," must of necessity be brought in "the county in which the subject 
of the action...is situated." (Judicial Code 78-13-1 U.C.A.) 
It was clearly error for Judge Tibbs to rule "improper venue." 
We would ask that his Order of Dismissal be set aside and the case be 
remanded to the 6th Judicial District Court with instructions. 
Dated this h day of March, 1986. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, Pro se 
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ADDENDUM " A " 
Recorded at Request of.. 
at M. Fee Paid $.. 
by Dtp. Book Page Ref.: 
;ee, c/o Myron Child
 f f 999 South 
— Address... 
WARRANTY DEED 
Grant  , ,  t  Main, Salt Lake City, UT. 
Mail tax nonce to 84111 
grantor 
CONVEY S AND VARRANT S 
, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, a Utah L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p 
of hereby 
the following described tract of land in Kane County, 
State of Utah 
to VOUR WORLD, INC.,, a Utah C o r p o r a t i o n ft 
grantee $ 
of Ten dollars and other good and valuable considerationsfor the sum of 8 
o 
DOLLARS, | 
4i 
a All of Parcels No. 14, 21, and 10 of the proposed ^ M 
STEVENS CANYON ESTATES, -an unrecorded Subdivison «1 
located in Sections 29 and 32, Township 38 South, g 
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The > 
legal descriptions are provided as follows: (*See Exhibit "AC 
Parcel 14 
Beginning at a point which is N00°03'W 2,102.43 feet along 
the section line and S89o14'07"E 362.68 feet from the Southwest 
corner of the Section 29, Township 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thense S89°14,G7"E 462.72 
feet; thence S13°33'W 84.36 feet, thence S08#10'W 396.53 feet; 
thence S66°17'E 169.13 feet; thence S72°53,E 104.02 feet; thence 
S46°26-E 143.56 feet; thence S56023*54HW 400.28 feet; thence 
N61*18'W 154.75 feet; thence N63°06'W 238.50 feet; thence N15° 
27'W 320.27 feet; thence N46°14 'W118.85 feet; thence N04»52'W 
126.72 feet; thence N27°42'E 173.31 feet; thence N39°07,E 60.61 
feet to the point of beginning. Containing 9.88 acres.%. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 3-1*- day of 
jJtVJt^ty^i . A . D . 1 9 ? / 
n the Presence of 
n
 - \ c$U^ 
4 t i l _ ^ 3 ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S < ^ v c A ^ 
On the <?*** day of (\CujjyY\\OQ^ • A. D. 1 9 ^ 
personally appeared before m c ^ . V J ^ 0<^p^ 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
(w£AAQAfvc...O 2 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires«^jutsj„ 1 ^ . . . ^ 5 S 5 L Residing in. 
•LAM* M«. |<M— - ««v ,,a. co - ' ••, a.oo , . . r - , . t , ,.»«, c l T r 
Parcel 21 
Beginning at a point which is S89°12,38*E 1,367.80 feet 
along the section line and South 2.0? feet from the Southwest 
corner of Section 29, Township 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence N19*23*W 168.62 feet; 
thence S88*15*51*E 233.29 feet; thence N17#47,46*E 481.81 feet; 
thence N77*59'E 579.72 feet; thence S16045,E 209.98 feet; thence 
S41°54'W 244.19 feet; thence S12#24#W 179.29 feet; thence S62°46'rf 
174.66 feet; thence S06*33,E 239.33 feet; thence 539*20^ 100.88 
feet; thence ^54*45^ 247.44 feet; thenct K20°31'W 239.79 feet; 
thence N87o09fW 40.50 feet; thence S09°59,W 183.34 fi-etj thence 
S61°04»W 76.97 feet; thence N62°00'W 150.39 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Containing 10.18 acres. 
Parcel 10 
Beginning at a point which is S86*34,14HE 1324.20 feet 
from the West Quarter Corner of Section 29, Township 38 South, 
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the Southwest corner 
of said Section 29 bears S00°03,E 2834.45 feet from said West 
Quarter Corner of Section 29); the point of beginning also being 
the Southwest corner of the SE1/4 NWl/4«of said Section 29; and 
running thence N00°10'50ME 282.69 feet along the 40 acre line; 
thence N45°46'E 182.32 feet; thence S44°31,E 611.29 feet; thence 
S45°29'W 212.83 feet; thence 307*45^ 249.95 feet; thence S25°-
15'W 179.51 feet; thence S61°12'W 129.78 feet; thence S50°15,W 
100.28 feet; thence N68°03'W 333.20 feet, thence N27°26'46"E 
436.47 feet; thence N00°10f50"E 200.00 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing 10.00 acres. 
Exhibit "AM 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
P.-0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, an 
individual; JANICE DAVIS, 
an individual; and 
WILLIAM G. DYER; an in-
dividual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, an 
individual; CASCADE 
FALLS CORPORATION, 
formerly a Utah Corpora-
tion; and REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, 
a Utah limited partner-
ship, 
Defendants, 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. C3QJ2*$~ 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, complain of 
defendants and for a cause of action allege as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. R. Crawford Davis is and has been a resident of Utah 
County at all times material hereto. 
2. Janice Davis is and has been a resident of Utah County 
« / 
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County at all times material hereto. 
\A\ 4. Howard F. Hatch is and has been a resident of Utah 
County at all times material hereto. 
5. Cascade Falls Corporation was a Utah Corporation until 
it was dissolved in 1975 by the Secretary of the State of Utah 
for failing to maintain its good standing within the State of 
Utah. Howard F. Hatch was an officer and/or director of 
said corporation until its dissolution in 1975. 
6. Real Estate Development Consultants, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "REDC"), is authorized 
to conduct business within the State of Utah and has its princi-
pal place of business in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah. 
7. On July 15, 1971, the parties entered into a Limited 
Partnership Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A". Plain-
tiffs R. Crawford Davis and William G. Dyer are named as limited 
partners in said Limited Partnership Agreement. Plaintiff 
Janice Davis is the wife of the late D. Evan Davis who is 
named as a limited partner in said Limited Partnership Agreement 
and whose interest devolved upon plaintiff Janice Davis pursuant 
\ to said Limited Partnership Agreement and by operation of law. 
8. The initial general partner of REDC was Cascade Falls 
Corporation, a Utah corporation. In November, 1975, the certi-
ficate of limited partnership of REDC was amended with Howard 
F. Hatch and Larry Don Smith named as general partners. A 
copy of the amended certificate of limited partnership is 
Y 
F. Hatch and Larry Don Smith named as general partners. A 
copy of the amended certificate of limited partnership is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 
"B". 
* i* 9. On or about September 19, 1978
 f defendant Howard F. 
Hatch purchased the interest of Larry Don Smith, leaving Howard 
F. Hatch as the sole general partner of the above-referenced 
partnership as indicated in a letter from Howard F. Hatch to 
the limited partners, a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "C". 
10. On September 28, 1978, the limited partners purchased 
an additional five (5%) percent interest in the limited partner-
ship, leaving each of the limited partners with a fifteen (15%) 
percent interest in the limited partnership. Defendant Howard 
F. Hatch holds the remaining twenty-five (25%) percent interest 
in the limited partnership. 
11. The principal asset of REDC is approximately 750 
• ' ' •• r 
acres of real property known as Stevens Canyon Estates, a plat 
of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference 
as Exhibit "D". The property was purchased from Mr. C. E. 
Meeks and was to be paid off over time from the sale of parcels 
of the property. 
12. On information and belief, plaintiffs allege that defen-
dant, Howard F. Hatch, has mismanaged their investment and has 
breached his fiduciary duties to them, all to their ecomonic 
detriment as set forth below. 
aO 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conflict of Interest) 
13. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
paragraphs one through and including twelve of plaintiffs' 
.complaint. 
14. As the general partner for REDC, defendant Howard 
Hatch engaged in numerous business transactions with other 
entities in which he already had significant and substantial 
financial interests, creating a severe conflict of interest in 
defendant Hatch as the general partner for REDC. 
15. As general partner of REDCf defendant Howard Hatch 
transacted business numerous times with Howard Hatch & As-
sociates, an entity over which Howard Hatch had and continues 
to have principal if not exclusive control. Defendant Hatch 
also worked for or had an interest in Equitable Realty, and, 
as general partner of REDC, transacted business with this 
entity. Plaintiffs allege that these conflicts of interest 
have adversely affected their ecomonic interest in REDC. 
16. As general partner of REDC, defendant Howard Hatch 
has engaged in several business transactions with University 
Avenue Development Associates, an entity for which Howard 
Hatch is either the general partner or the owner. Plaintiffs 
allege that University Avenue Development Associates loaned in 
excess of $42,000 to REDC, and this conflict of interest 
has adversely affected plaintiffs' interest in REDC. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
17. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
paragraphs one through and including sixteen of plaintiffs' 
complaint, 
18. Pursuant to the limited partnership agreement, the 
general partner, already given a fifty percent (50%) interest 
in REDC, was not entitled to receive a management fee for his 
services. See Exhibit "A" at 4. Nevertheless, over the past 
11 years, defendant Howard Hatch has, either individually or 
through Howard Hatch & Associates, received commissions from 
the sales of parcels of real property belonging to REDC. 
19. Not only did defendant Howard Hatch wrongfully awarded 
himself commissions in violation of the limited partnership 
agreement, the commissions he gave himself were far in excess 
of those permitted by realtors generally. Plaintiffs allege 
that, as a general rule, realtors' fees have fluctuated between 
5 to 10 percent of the price of the property, 10% coming to a 
realtor only in the event of an extremely fine effort to sell 
difficult land. However, for almost every parcel of REDC land 
sold, defendant Howard Hatch awarded himself a realtor's commis-
sion of at least twenty (20%) percent, and in most cases thirty 
(30%) percent. Said commissions, totaling approximately 
$50,000.00, plus interest, rightfully belong to and are assets 
of REDC, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 
20. Defendant Howard Hatch is and has been a realtor at 
all times material hereto, and knew or should have known of 
the prevailing realtor's fees for the sale of this type of land. 
That defendant Howard Hatch willfully, deliberately, and in-
tentionally awarded himself realtor's fees up to four-hundred 
<fc>40Q%) percent higher than the generally prevailing rate cannot, 
under any set of circumstances, be considered excusable neglect 
or mere negligence. The defendant has intentionally and 
deliberately violated his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
to REDC and to the limited partners, knowing that the fees he 
awarded to himself, either individually or through Howard Hatch 
& Associates, unreasonably exceeded those fees typically charged 
by all realtors. This type of willful, deliberate and inten-
tional conduct by the defendant requires the application of 
punitive damages in this case. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Self Dealing) 
21. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
paragraphs one through and including twenty of plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
22. Defendant Howard Hatch sold to himself two ten acre 
parcels of land of REDC, the purchase price of which is presently 
unknown. Plaintiffs allege that any purchases of REDC land by 
Howard Hatch must be for the fair market value. If the price 
paid by Howard Hatch for said parcels was less than fair market 
value, plaintiffs allege that Howard Hatch should be required 
to pay the difference. 
23. Plaintiffs allege that lots 6, 9, 60 and 61 have been 
taken off the market by defendant Hatch and "reserved" for 
himself. Thusr while defendant Howard Hatch has not paid for 
said lots, said lots have not been available tq the^public for 
pale, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Failure to Provide Financial Statements) 
24. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
paragraphs one through and including twenty-three of plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
25. The Limited Partnership Agreement requires the defendant 
to have prepared by Certified Public Accountant an annual 
financial statement containing a balance sheet and an income 
statement. Moreover, a copy or condensed version of such 
financial statement as well as the partnership tax returns were 
required to be furnished to each member of the partnership at 
the close of each accounting year. The defendant has, however, 
failed to provide such formal accounting to the limited partners 
on an annual basis, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Distribution of Assets upon Dissolution) 
26. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
paragraphs one through and including twenty-five of plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
27. The Limited Partnership Agreement provides for the 
following method of distribution of assets upon dissolution: 
a. The expenses of liquidation and the"debts of 
the partnership, other than any other debts owing 
to the partners, shall be paid. 
b. Such debts of the partnership as are owing 
to the partners, including any loans and advances 
§P iA\ reimbursement for expenses for the partnership, 
shall be paid. 
c. The partner's initial capital contribution. 
d The total of the partner's addition captial 
contributions paid pursuant to paragraph 10(a) 
hereof. 
e. The remaining proceeds shall be distributed to 
the partners to the same extent and in the same 
manner that the partners share in the profits 
and losses. 
f. Should the general partner cease to act as a 
general partner for any reason during the term of 
this agreement, he shall be treated as a limited 
partner and shall not lose his right to share in 
profits and losses in the ratio set forth in Exhibit 
,8AM . 
28. The above referenced method of distribution is, however, 
in direct conflict with the applicable Utah statute which 
governs the distribution of assets. That statute, Utah Code 
Annotated, §48-2-23 (1981), states as follows: 
1. Distribution of Assets. In settling accounts 
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after dissolution, the liabilities of the partner-
ship shall be entitled to payment in the following 
order: 
a. Those to creditors, in the order of priority 
as provided by law, except those to limited 
partners on account of their contributions, 
and to general partners. 
b. Those to limited partners, in respect to 
their share of the profits and other com-
pensation by way of incomes on their 
contributions. 
c. Those to limited partners, in respect to the 
the capital of their contributions. 
Those to general partners, other than for capital 
and profits. 
Those to general partners, in respect to profits, 
f. Those to general partners, in respect to capital. 
29. The conflict between the above two methods of distribut-
ing assets is immediately apparent. While parties are typically 
j! free to contract according to their desires, the general rule 
i | 
jj of law does not permit parties to entor into a contract which 
'} 
•! conflicts directly with applicable state law. In other words, 
; j 
:j the method of distribution as outlined by Utah State Statute 
must prevail oveF^that. outlined in the limited partnership 
agreement. 
30. This exact type of dispute was recently litigated in 
Dycus v. Belco Industries, Inc., 569 P2d 553 (Okla. App. 1977), 
and the court expressly held that the method of distribution as 
outlined in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act took priority 
over any other agreed upon method of distribution. The Court 
concluded as follows: 
"We hold, then that [the general partner's] claim 
for advances must take a statutory place behind 
creditors^and limited partners." 569 P.2d at 556v/ 
31. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that, upon dissolution, 
the assets of REDC should be distributed in the manner provided 
by Utah State law. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendant, 
Howard Hatch as follows: 
1. For an accounting of REDC, the cost of which to be 
borne by the defendant Howard Hatch. 
2. For the sum of $100,000, or such other greater sum as 
may be proved at trial, as a return of the commissions wrong-
fully taken by defendant Hatch and for additional actual damages 
3. For a dissolution of the limited partnership, REDC, 
with its assets to be distributed according to Utah State law. 
4. For interest at the highest legal rate on all sums 
wrongfully taken by the defendants. 
5. For general damages in an amount not less than $10,000. 
6. For punitive damages in an amount not less than $25,000. 
7. For costs of this action, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court dee.s 
just and reasonable in the premises. 
DATED this / S ^ _ day of February, 1983. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Plaintiffs' address 
R. Crawford Davis 
2765 North 550 East 
Provo, Utah 84604 
William G. Dyer 
3077 Mojave Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Janice Davis 
2585 North 650 East 
Provo# Utah 84604 
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real property described on Exhibit "B" at the price indicated thereon. The partner-
ship will pay the general partner for the property the sum indicated on Exhibit ,fB,M 
and the general partner is authorized upon conveyance of the property to the partner-
ship to make payment to himself from the partnership assets, the purchase price. 
11. Duties and Management. 
(a) The general partner shall contribute his services and experience 
Ln connection with the adoption of plans for, and the supervision of the project; 
>hall_ devote such time as shall be reasonably required in Jrurtherance of the purposes 
md objects^of the limited partnership; and shall cause to be constructed and completed 
In a good workmanlike manner any structures to be erected on the subject real property 
Ln accordance with such plans and specifications as the general partner shall approve 
m behalf of the limited partnership. Such structures to be constructed within a 
•easonable time after execution hereof, due allowance being made for completion of 
>lans and specifications, the obtaining of necessary financing, and the issuance of 
lecessary permits by the appropriate governmental authority, and shall be diligently 
:arried forward to completion. The general partner shall also use his best efforts 
,o obtain the necessary construction financing and shall let the necessary contracts 
br construction work for said development. 
F*(b) The general partner shall have control of the partnership business 
nd all actions shall require the consent of the general partner. The general partner 
hall have exclusive control over the business of the partnership and shall have 
uthority to act on behalf of the partnership in all matters respecting the partnership, 
ts business, and its property, subject to the limitations stated elsewhere in this 
greement. Without limitation upon the generality of the above, the general partner 
hall have authority to employ at the expense of the partnership, such agents, land 
urveyers and/or employees, independent contractors, attorneys, and accountants 
s they deem reasonably necessary; to sell or exchange, in whole or in part, the 
artnership property; to create by grant or otherwise easements and servitudes; to 
Iter, improve, repair, raze, replace and rebuild partnership property; to let or 
ease property for any purpose, including exploration for and removal of gas, oil and 
ther mineral and natural resourses, and for any period; to effect necessary insurance 
3r the proper protection of the partnership and of the general and limited partners, 
r of any of them; to pay, collect, compromise,, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust any and 
LI claims or demands of or against the partnership; and to bind the partnership in 
LI transactions involving the partnership's real or personal property or business 
"fairs including the execution of all deeds, loan obligations, deeds of trust and 
)tes. The general partner shall devote such time to the business of the.partnership 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing were 
hand delivered or mailed to the attorney for the Defendants by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, this /^ day of March 1986 and addressed as follows: 
Mr. Michael D. Dyer 
CSB Tower 
Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Howard F. Hatch 
